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Abstract

SDM is a Secure Delegation Model for Javabased distributed object environments. SDM
extends current Java security features to support secure remote method invocations that
may involve chains of delegated calls across
distributed objects. The framework supports
a control API for application developers to
specify mechanisms and security policies surrounding simple or cascaded delegation. Delegation may also be disabled and optionally
revoked. These policies may be controlled explicitly in application code, or implicitly via
administrative tools.

1 Introduction

Open distributed computing environments
must address four symmetrical security issues:

Services need not trust Users. For exam-

ple, a database service may require that
only certain users be able to modify
records.
Users need not trust Services. For example, a person using an unknown wordprocessor application may not wish it to
delete existing les.
Users need not trust Users. For example,
a system administrator may only transiently allow an ordinary user to access
a resource such as a tape drive.
Services need not trust Services. For example, a distributed database service may
limit rights of di erent application programs that use it.

work, the Secure Delegation Model. SDM integrates support for these di erent aspects of
security in Java-based distributed systems.
SDM is an architectural framework for
structuring remote method invocations (RMI)
among distributed components. It does not
involve new encryption techniques, authentication protocols, or language constructs.
SDM instead builds upon existing mechanisms, mainly those already established in the
Java JDK1.2 security framework, to establish
a practical basis for constructing exible yet
secure components and support infrastructure.
This paper focuses on the way in which delegation is structured and used in SDM to support secure operation when multiple components together provide a given service. Other
aspects of the framework are described only
brie y. Readers may nd further details in
[6].
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 de nes Java-based security
concepts and terminology surrounding Principals, Permissions, Privileges, Roles, and Security Domains. Section 3 introduces the SDM
delegation framework. Section 4 describes the
details of the resulting protocols, which are extended in Section 5 to handle dynamic revocation of delegated privileges. Section 6 brie y
compares SDM to other approaches.

2 Concepts and Terminology
Principals. All parties associated with se-

cure computation in SDM are known via principals : identities (unique names) that can be
authenticated. We further restrict attention
to scoped principals, for example Syracuse's
This paper describes the delegation-based Nataraj, where the scope represents an organimechanisms that underly a proposed frame- zational domain (which may in turn be further

java.security.acl.Principal
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String getServiceName()
Date timeExecStarted()
Role[] getActiveRoles()
URL residingURL()
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String getRoleName()
RoleCertificate getRoleCertificate

java.security.Identity

Role[] getInheritedRoles()
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Privilege[] getPrivileges()
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Figure 1: Principals in SDM
structured and scoped in any fashion). Principals are most often associated with individual people. However, they may also be associated with entities such as departments (as in
Acme's MarketingDept, entire companies, or
any other authenticatable unit. In SDM, we
further categorize principals in terms of the
properties and usages as discussed in the remainder of this paper and implemented via the
classes and interfaces illustrated in Figure 1.

Signing. Java software components may be

signed. The CodeSource associated with a

les, and the URL representing the location
from which those class les are to be downloaded. Access can then be controlled based
on such a CodeSource.

CodeExecutors. A signed component may

be obtained from a software vendor and then
executed used by a variety of users. Normally,
the principal executing the code is di erent
from the one that signed the classes. To clarify
the resulting distinctions, we introduce the the
concept of a CodeExecutor to be the principal
invoking a given service, and upon which authentication, delegation or access control can
be based.

component (i.e., one or more related classes)
includes a set of signers recording the principals who developed that piece of code, or
those who authorize the validity of the code. Permissions. A permission is a named
In the current Java model, a CodeSource en- value conferring the ability (or formal consent)
capsulates a set of signers who signed the class to perform actions in a system. We focus

mainly on permissions based on Access control policies, that grant permissions to principals on the basis of security attributes or privileges typically maintained via Access Control Lists (ACLs). In order to make an control decision, access decision functions compare the permissions granted to a principal
against the permissions required to perform an
operation. For example, permission to read a
le /tmp/foo.txt can be denoted as
FilePermission: read:/tmp/foo.txt.

Privileges. A privilege is a security at-

tribute which may be shared by possibly many
principals. We focus on the kinds of privileges
de ned in the XGSS and CORBA speci cations, that include groups, roles, clearances
and capabilities [7]. For example, Bill Clinton
might have the privileges:
role: President-of-USA
capability: OccupyWhiteHouse
group: AmericanPresidents
accessId: WilliamClinton
Note that the permission to occupy the White
House may be a capability transiently issued
to him, with an expiration at the end of his
presidency.

2.1 Roles

A given person or principal need not always
have the same set of privileges. Rather than
continually change them across di erent contexts, it is convenient to introduce the notion
of a role, a set of actions and responsibilities
associated with a particular activity [11] that
might be adopted by any principal. A role is
normally represented as a set of privilege attributes that a principal or set of principals
can exercise within a context of an organization. The notion of a role does not add
any power to a security framework, but instead improves manageability by adding an
optional level of indirection. Role-based access control provides a higher level of granularity than approaches limited only to individuals. Because roles make transient privilege assignment much easier to administer, they have
been widely adopted in security frameworks.

of a given role. In SDM, an executing Identity
adopting a role is represented as a RoleIdentity. A RoleIdentity contains a RoleCerti cate within it that it can be presented to any
server. RoleCerti cates have associated names
and privileges, along with any other role hierarchy information; for example rules stating
that all Managers are also Employees. When
a principal authenticates itself and presents a
valid role certi cate, the privileges associated
with that role becomes e ective for the principal.

Adopting Roles. Roles may be used to

obtain both extensions and reductions of
privileges[1]. Reductions are typically performed in accord with a \least privilege" policy in which principals have only the privileges
they need to accomplish a given task. Examples include:






An administrator may want to have the
powers of ordinary users most of the time,
except when performing installation or
user account creation.
Users invoking untrusted software might
want to reduce their powers before doing
so.
Users wishing to delegate only some of
their privileges to others.

A principal A may adopt role R and act
with the identity (A as R) when transiently
obtaining or reducing powers. The privileges
associated with a role work in the same way as
those associated with principals. For example,
a Manager role might have privileges:
group: CEOAnnouncementRecipients
group: companyBudgetReviewers
capability: MakeAppointmentO er
-grantedBy Company
capability: ChargeCompanyCreditCard
-grantedBy Company

A principal plays a role by associating itself
with one of its roles for a particular period of
time. Thus, these privilege attributes must beRole Certi cates. A Role Certi cate is an come associated with the principal. In SDM,
authenticatable device that provides evidence this is accomplished by querying the RoleIdenthat a given principal possesses the attributes tity for its privileges.

Multiple Roles. A given principal can play This could, for example, be implemented at
multiple roles at the same time. So long as
those selected roles are allowed to co-exist (i.e.,
they are not mutually disjoint roles), the principal can exercise the roles simultaneously, and
thus obtain the union of privileges associated
with them. To extend the above example, in
a company intranet environment, access to a
budget information le might be limited to
the group named companyBudgetReviewers.
A principal who has been assigned role of a
Manager can access this information , due its
privilege which contains the group membership. This group membership need not be explicitly assigned to the identity, but can just be
associated with a role, in this case Manager.
Similarly, the capability to make an o er to
a candidate is automatic for a Manager as it
contains the capability MakeAppointmentOffer having been granted by the company itself.

2.2 Domains
Protection Domains. A protection domain is an administrative scoping construct

for establishing system and service security
policies. The Java 1.2 security architecture
provides support for protection domains and
domain based access control. Currently, the
creation of domains is based on a CodeSource
indicating a URL and code signers. SDM extends this framework to include explicit support for principals.

Principal Domains. In SDM, each service

is run on behalf of some principal, the CodeExecutor, who takes the responsibility for that
service. In particular, given a remote service
running on a machine at a port (mapping to a
URL), there is an authoritative CodeExecutor
responsible for that service. Implementation
of SDM requires that the JDK1.2 domain
model be extended to include principals, so
that each CodeSource will also have a principal associated with it. One domain will be
formed for each such <CodeExecutor, CodeSource>. Further authentication and access
control (and delegation) may then be based
on the CodeExecutor.
To support PrincipalDomains, the Java runtime system must maintain a mapping from
<CodeSource, CodeExecutor> pair to their
protection domains and also the mapping between protection domains and their privileges.

the execution stack level with the aid of class
blocks and the executing environment frame,
as illustrated in Figure2. More complete details can be found in [6].

3 Delegation
Secure delegation occurs when one object
(the delegator or initiator) authorizes another
object (the delegate) to perform some task using (some of) the rights of the delegator. The
authorization lasts until some target object
(end-point) provides the service. The essence
of secure delegation is to be able to verify
that an object that claims to be acting on another's behalf, is indeed authorized to act on
its behalf[14].
The problem becomes more complicated in
practice when we consider mobile objects,
agents and downloadable content being passed
around an open network, where the initiator
need not have a clue of where all its representative objects are passed around. Additionally, a
number of practical issues must be solved: The
framework must be scalable in wide area networks, remain ecient under widespread use,
and remain secure when dealing with complex
trust relationships that can emerge in practice. Toward these ends, SDM provides a multifaceted approach, supporting any of several
styles and protocols, including both simple
(impersonation) and cascaded (chained) delegation, as well as means to disable and revoke
delegation.

3.1 Protection Domains and Delegation
In Java (as of release 1.2), a protection domain is created for each CodeSource. In SDM,
this notion is extended to form PrincipalDomains based on CodeExecutors as well. A
target (or intermediate) controls access to its
methods based on protection domains, i.e.,
<PrincipalDomain, ProtectionDomain> pair.
Access is then controlled via the permission associated with both the CodeExecutor and/or
CodeSource.
SDM delegation protocols are based on the
notion that when a client delegates its rights
to one object in a domain (i.e., when it enables
delegation before invoking on a target object),
it e ectively delegates its rights to all the ob-
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Figure 2: Obtaining domain information from execution stack
jects in that domain. This is implemented
via DelegationCerti cates, that behave analogously to RoleCerti cates. In particular, a
DelegationCerti cate passed to a delegate can
only be used by the object it is issued for.
A set of security requirements is associated
with each object. If an intermediate object
needs delegation from initiator, it speci es the
delegation mode in its security requirements.
Depending on the context (see Section 4), a
delegation session may be established. If the
target does not need to further delegate actions, no delegation certi cate is generated by
the client.
When initiating a delegation session, information about the initiating principal (CodeExecutor) is associated with the context of
invocation. This is propagated through the
underlying layer to the remote server (target)
and gets associated (principal and CodeSource
pair) with a protection domain. The target
may provide access based on the identity of an
individual or based on privileges it has (based
on its e ective role during invocation).

3.2 Modes and Chaining

A series of objects may be involved in a
given service request. For example, suppose
some object A (client) invokes a method on
another object B (target). Object B might
complete the task on its own or might in turn
invoke a method on another object, C. In this
context, object B which was earlier the target (for A's invocation) becomes a client for
the method invocation on object C. Thus objects that are at rst targets may later become clients. This e ectively forms a delegation chain where object A is the initiator,
object C is the nal target and object B is an
intermediate.
There are three di erent approaches, or
modes, that may apply to such chains (see Figure 3):

NoDelegation. The intermediate exercises
its own rights for further access.

SimpleDelegation. Impersonation; either
restricted or unrestricted.

NoDelegation

Only the invoking object’s privileges are propogated
client’s privileges

Client

SimpleDelegation

intermediate’s privileges

Intermediate

FinalTarget

Only the initiator’s privileges are propogated
client’s privileges

Client

client’s privileges

Intermediate

FinalTarget

CascadedDelegation Both initiator’s and intermediate’s privileges are combined
client’s + intermediate’s
privileges

client’s privileges

Client

Intermediate

FinalTarget

Figure 3: Delegation Chaining

CascadedDelegation. Combining rights of
initiator and delegates.

After obtaining the delegation certi cate
from a delegator, an intermediate object might
invoke a method on another object down the
chain. At this point, the intermediate may decide to use only the delegator's privileges or
combine it with its own privileges. This decision of either passing delegator's privileges
only (impersonation) or combining its privileges too (composite) is based on the delegation mode speci ed for the intermediate
object. Mode speci cation may be explicit
through the application, or may be implicitly
set by the administrator of that object service.

3.3 Controlling Delegation

Objects can explicitly enable delegation
at the application level. This is accomplished by using an AccessController object.
The AccessController method enable-

permits delegation. Method
is similar, except that when a role type is passed, the
available privileges for that session are extended or restricted to the privileges associated with that enabled role. This functionality is not restricted to delegation. It can also
be used whenever access to local methods and
resources need special control. For example,
consider a system administrator who logged
in as a normal user but would like to exercise
super-user privileges for an account creation.
In this case, the administrator could invoke
enablePrivileged(superUser) to enable super user privileges.
Either implicit or explicit enabling can be
used to specify control in cases of Cascaded
Delegation where the intermediary objects are
unaware of secure delegation. If the intermediate is unaware, then the underlying security
layer must e ectively carry out either Simple
Delegation or a special delegation mode set by
Privileged()
enablePrivileged(RoleType)

public class TravelAsst {
:
public void makeReservation() {
:
AccessController.enablePrivileged(managerRole);
AccessController.enableSimpleDelegation();
remoteAdmin.purchaseTicket();
AccessController.disableDelegation();
AccessController.disablePrivilege();
:
}
}

Figure 4: Sample Usage
an administrator. In SDM, explicitly specied modes are settable at the application level
may and override the default mode set by the
administrator. Either way, delegation requirements become attached to an intermediate object's reference. This set of requirements is
made available to any client holding a reference to this remote (intermediate object) reference.
In contrast, a delegation-aware intermediate might explicitly enable delegation for a
method call. In SDM, this explicit delegation
may be performed at the application level. If
delegation is enabled, the client may generate
a delegation certi cate and pass it on to the
intermediate object. Otherwise, no delegation
certi cate is generated and the intermediate
provides service using only its privileges and
none of the delegator's (in which case, NoDelegation is the delegation mode).
An intermediate may also explicitly enable
delegation using the AccessController methods enableSimpleDelegation() and enableCascadedDelegation(). The speci ed
delegation mode is taken into account when
privileges of the intermediate need to be presented to consecutive objects in the method
invocation chain. Whether the intermediate's
privileges are combined with the delegator's
is based on the mode of delegation. The system can obtain the security requirements attached to any remote reference. The delegation, if required by the speci ed requirements
(and target object is thus willing to act as a
delegate), is activated appropriately from the
context. Using the context of invocation, delegator's AccessControler determines the Code-

Executor who is executing client's code. This
CodeExecutor becomes the Signer of a delegation certi cate, and thus e ectively the initiator of a delegation.
An example of application-level control is
shown in the code segment in Figure 4.
This code could be used to handle situations in which a client object invokes method
makeReservation() on an object of type
TravelAsst. The TravelAsst object might in
turn invoke methods on a remoteAdmin object.
In the sample code, the travelAsst explicitly
enables delegation before further invocation on
remoteAdmin.

3.4 Delegation Certi cates
When an object decides to delegate a task
to another object (e ectively to the CodeExecutor of that object), it creates a delegation certi cate. This certi cate speci es the
initiator, role it is delegating, any constraints
that are bound to the delegation, a nonce, validity period and its DelegationServer name for
handling queries regarding delegation revocation. A role certi cate is associated with the
role being delegated, which might contain a
set of privileges associated with it.
A delegation certi cate is generated using
the CodeExecutor as FromPrincipal and the
CodeExecutor of the remoteAdmin object as
the ToPrincipal. Implementations could be
based on public key cryptography using X.509
certi cates, as illustrated in Figure 5. The associated role (and hence, set of privileges) is
speci ed in the certi cate.
A delegation certi cate is issued for every

X509CertInfo
SubjectName
SubjectPublicKey
ValidityPeriod
IssuerName
SerialNumber
Algorithm
Issuer
IssuerID
SubjectID

(meaning in delegation cert)
ToPrincipal
ToPrincipal-key
DelegationPeriod
FromPrincipal
DelegationID

Delegation

Certificate

Identity getInitiator()
Identity getDelegator()
long getDelegationID()
Role getDelegatedRole()
String[] getDelegateChain()

X509Certificate
X509CertInfo

DelegationCertInfo

--Signature--

boolean isValid()
boolean isRevocable()
boolean isDelegatable()
boolean isPermittedDelegate(
Principal p)
Identity getDelegate()
Privilege[] getPrivileges()

DelegatedRoleName
RoleCertificate or RoleServerURL
DelegationQueryServerURL
DelegationConstraints

URL getInitiatorServer()

DelegationCertificate
DelegationCertInfo
--Signature--

Figure 5: X.509 and Delegation Certi cates
delegation session unless an earlier delegation
has been set to remain valid for consecutive
sessions. The type of the delegation certi cate (SimpleDelegationCert or CascadedDelegationCert) re ects the kind of delegation
that is activated for this session. If the delegation is revocable, the end-point makes sure
that the delegation certi cate is not revoked
before it provides access.
Selection of consecutive delegates is made
by an intermediate. Selected principal (CodeExecutor of the selected object for further delegation) is veri ed to be a permitted delegate
by invoking the isPermittedDelegate(Principal) method on the certi cate (DelegationCerti cates must implement the Delegation
interface shown in Figure 5). This method will
scan through the list of exempted delegates
(if any) and accordingly will return a boolean

value, indicating whether or not the principal
is a valid delegate.

4 Delegation Protocols
SDM employs a set of basic protocols that
underly the usages described in Section 3.
SDM delegation protocols specify what information gets exchanged when an object A invokes a method on object B. The underlying
layer must determine the delegation mode to
be enabled from the context and security requirements attached to the target (remote reference B ). Thus, the security policy for an intermediate object governs which privileges and
delegation mode to apply at any given context.
(See Figure 6.)
Di erent rules apply for each of the combinations of required and speci ed modes that

A

B

C

getSecurityRequirements

authentication
create DCab DelegationCertificate
DelegationCertificate
become a DelegateIdentity ’BforA’
associate DCab with the its delegateIdentity
combine B’s privileges if mode is CascadedDelegation
access any method or resource as ’BforA’
getSecurityRequirements

authentication
check if DCab is delegatable further
check if C is not in delegate-exception list in DCab
create DCbc DelegationCertificate BtoC
nest the DCab Certificate within DCbc
DelegationCertificate
become DelegateIdentity’Cfor’BforA’’
associate DCbc with DelegateIdentity
if revocable, contact initiator A
combine privileges if Cascaded
access methods as ’Cfor’BforA’’

Figure 6: Main Delegation Protocol in SDM
can occur in a sequence of invocations from an exception is thrown and the operation is
object A to object B to C. (i.e A ! B ! C ): not carried out.

does not enable Delegation, specenables Delegation,
requires
i es NoDelegation. Delegation is disabled NoDelegation. If the security requirements
for this session. No delegation certi cates are
generated. Methods on object B are invoked
as if invoked by object A, and methods invoked by object B on the next object in the
delegation chain are invoked with object B 's
privileges and so on. Any object that is invoked by B will not get any information that
re ects that A has delegated to B to complete
the task.

attached to B specify that delegation not be
enabled for this session, then no delegation
certi cate is generated. The method on object B is invoked as if invoked by object A,
and method invoked by object B on the next
object in the delegation chain is invoked with
object B 's privileges and so on.

enables Delegation, requires Delegation. If B requires delegation, A must
does not enable Delegation, spec- generate a delegation certi cate, DCab, to B.
i es Simple or Cascaded Delegation. This delegation certi cate is available to B for
Delegation is disabled for this session even any further invocation. Consider when B need
though B requires it. When the operation that to invoke a method on another object C. Such
requires delegation from A to B is attempted, invocation on object C is carried out by B as

a DelegateIdentity (B for A) (i.e., B is a del- only the privileges gained through delegation
egate and A is the initiator).
(A's privileges only), or also includes the privileges of the delegate identity itself (both B 's
enables Delegation, speci es Simple privileges and A's privileges). Thus the set of
Delegation. Further invocations (and dele- privileges returned by the delegate re ects the
gations, if any) made by B are made as (B for privilege of the identity (B for A) during that
A) with only the privileges of A being used. context.
In other words, B impersonates A (B as A). Based on access control policies on the tarAny target that receives a request from B will get C, the method invocation and any related
authenticate B and obtain the delegation cer- resource accesses are controlled. These access
ti cate DCab . Further control will be based control policies may be based on only the inion privileges of A and B 's capacity to act as a tiator (A) or might depend on the delegates as
delegate.
well.

enables Delegation, speci es Cas- If C requires delegation from its requester
caded Delegation. Further invocations and B is a delegate for A possessing a delegate
and delegations are made by B by combin- certi cate DCab , i.e., (B for A) then:
ing both the privileges of A (using delegation
certi cate DCab ) and B (by providing neces- 1. B rst checks if this delegation is forwardsary role certi cates or identity certi cates).
In other words, B represents A by combining
the privileges of both A and B. Any target receiving a request from B will base its access
decision on A being a initiator and B being a
delegate, with the combined privileges of both
A and B.

4.1 Chained Invocations
Once the intermediate B has obtained the
delegation certi cate DCab from A, it has the
authority to speak for A. To complete the
service, B might have to invoke methods on
other objects. When B selects C to be the
next target, B represents an entity (B for
A) and requires access to method invocation.
At this point B exercises the type DelegateIdentity and during the process of becoming a
DelegateIdentity, the delegation mode is considered to calculate the privileges of the delegate (here, B ). In this case of B being a
DelegateIdentity, B can authenticate for itself. Also, it provides the delegation certi cate DCab to prove that A has indeed delegated the task to B. C authenticates that it
is actually B it is talking to, through normal
authentication procedures. It veri es the delegation certi cate to be signed by A by verifying the digital signature of A that is engraved in the certi cate DCab . These provide
proof of the fact that \B speaks for A", abbreviated as or (B for A)[1]. The delegate's
(B 's) getPrivileges() method returns the
privileges associated with B, which is either

able, i.e., delegatable to further intermediaries.
2. If it is forwardable, B checks whether C
is present in an exception list provided
with the delegation certi cate DCab (i.e,
whether A disapproves any further delegation to C ).
3. If delegation to C is not prohibited, B
generates a delegation certi cate DCbc
and passes on DCab with it to C. The delegation certi cate DCbc may contain: i)
A's privileges only, ii) B 's privileges only,
or iii) a combination of both, depending
on the delegation mode speci ed in the
delegate identity B. Once B delegates to
C, the delegation chain becomes A ! B
! C, i.e., (C for (B for A)).

In contrast, if B is not a delegate for A, that
is if B had not speci ed delegation in its security requirements, then A would not have
generated (and passed on) the delegation certi cate DCab to B. In this case, when a request is issued to C, it is not possible for B
to establish A as the original initiator due to
the lack of a delegation certi cate. So C must
treat it as if the request originated from B and
handle it accordingly, without having any idea
about the involvement of A in the complete
invocation chain. Extending this chain to one
more principal, we get A ! B ! C ! D. If B
does not require delegation and C does, then
when the request reaches D, D will treat the

request to have initiated from B and delegated
through C.
Thus, at any given time, control is based
only on currently available information on the
delegation chain and the speci ed modes and
policies. SDM does not support any means
of tracing back calls through intermediaries to
obtain predecessor delegation certi cates.

4.2 An Example
Consider an example of an user, A, using the
services of a TravelAgent object, B. Let object
B provide services related to travel reservations and travel arrangments. It might in turn
need to make use of the services of AirlinesServices provided by an object, C. A obtains the
reference of B and invokes the makeReservation method on B. Object B might specify,
attached with its object reference, a set of security requirements. Let the security requirements specify that Delegation is required. In
SDM, our system will analyse this security requirement attached to an intermediate object
(in this case, object B ) and whether A is willing to delegate (known from A's security specication attached to its object reference). Mapping this example to the delegation protocol
described in Figure 6, the underlying system
generates a delegation certi cate and passes it
on to B.
Let the travel agent B contact the airline
object, C, to make an airline reservation by
invoking the purchaseTicket method. At this
point, B provides its certi cates (preferred
travel agent certi cate, certi ed travel agent,
etc) along with the delegation certi cate issued by A. B acts as a delegate, acting on
behalf of A, and makes a request to C. For
this request B combines its own privileges (of
being a preferred travel agent, authorizzation
to make reservations, etc) along with the privileges of the intiator A (as the service might
make use of A's credit card, or a travel coupon
issued explicitly to A). Thus B makes use of
CascadedDelegation facility provided by SDM
while invoking the purchaseTicket method on
the object C.

functionality, and so on. Even though it adds
complexity, any practical delegation protocol
must support revocation.
In SDM, revocability is an optional attribute of delegation. If performance is an
issue, or revocation is somehow known to
never ne necessary, the delegation can be made
non-revocable. This facility to explicitly enable or disable revocation is again carried
out using the AccessController object. The
changed revocation status remains valid, until
it gets changed again. The AccessController
method setRevocableDelegation(true) enables delegation to be revocable until it is set
otherwise.
If delegation is revocable, then the endpoint (but not necessarily any of the intermediate delegates) of a chain must be able to nd
out. In SDM, the DelegationID and delegation server (URL) associated with certi cates
de ne the uniqueness of a delegation certi cate. If the endpoint has not seen the delegation certi cate earlier, it must contact the
DelegationServer of the initiator and verify its
validity. And if it is not a one-shot delegation
(a delegation that is valid for one access request only), the end point registers itself as a
DelegationRevocationListener with the initiator.
When an end-point receives a service request from a principal, its AccessController checks if the service has been delegated
through the invoking principal, and if so
whether the delegation is revocable. If the
delegation is not revocable, it goes ahead to
provide/deny access according to the delegates
privileges.
But if the delegation is revocable:


The AccessController rst checks if
the delegation certi cate is in a local
<delegationCertificate, status> table.



If the certi cate is not present in the table, then this must be the rst time this
delegation certi cate has been obtained.
It contacts the DelegationServer of the
initiator querying the status of the delegation.



If the delegation is not one-shot, the user
setting is analyzed to see if the change-

5 Revocation
Sometimes users and services need to revoke privilege assignments. Users change their
minds; people leave groups, services change







of-status noti cation is periodic or aperiodic.
In the default aperiodic case, the endpoint registers itself as a DelegationStatusListener with the delegation server for
future updates only upon status changes.
In the periodic case, the end-point registers itself as a DelegationStatusListener
with the delegation server for future periodic updates at a given update interval.
If the delegation is revoked (i.e., the delegation is no longer valid), the access is
denied. Otherwise, the AccessController
then provides or denies access according
to resulting status and deletage privileges.

5.1 Revocation Noti cations

In SDM, revocation is possible even when
the initiator does not know the endpoint apriori. When an end-point ( nal target) receives a revocable delegation request, it registers with the initiator as being interested in
receiving revocation noti cations. Thus each
of such end-points register themselves as DelegationStatusListeners to the initiator. The
initiator in turn maintains a list of end-points
to whom its delegation has propagated. These
end points will implement the Noti cationHandler interface, to handle any event notication.
If the end point contacts the initiator every time before servicing a delegated request,
then the end point is considered to follow a
pure pull mechanism to obtain the status information from the initiator. A common alternative is pure push mechanisms, in which
the initiator continually broadcasts out revocation information. Analyses of similar protocols using Broadcast Disks [3] show that pure
pull provides extremely fast response time for
a lightly loaded server, but as the server becomes loaded, its performance degrades, until it ultimately stabilizes. The performance
of pure push is independent of the number
of clients listening to the broadcast. But if
the number of interested clients (end points) is
large, then its a wastage of resources to send irrelevant data. A more serious problem is that
the servers might not deliver the speci c data
needed by clients in a timely fashion. One solution suggested by Zdonik [3], is to allow the

clients to provide a pro le of their interests to
the servers.
In SDM, the clients are the end points who
are interested in the revocation status of certain delegations (serviced by those end points).
When an end-point receives a delegated request, the rst time around it pulls information from the initiator about revocation status and at the same time registers itself to receive delegation-related events. The pro les
of those end points of interest in SDM, are the
details on whether they require periodic push
or aperiodic push. A aperiodic push is event
driven { a data transmission is triggered by
an event such as data update (in SDM, it is a
change delegation status). Hence, end points
(and hence, the Noti cationHandlers) are noti ed of any change in delegation or its privileges by the initiator (which might use a helper
object that implements EventGenerator interface). A periodic push is performed according
to some pre-arranged schedule. The end point,
when it registers itself with the initiator, will
specify the time interval of periodic updates
(pushes). Hence, the initiator will push delegation details at speci ed time intervals to
the registered end points. This leaves it to the
end point to specify whether it needs aperiodic
or periodic (if so, the necessary time interval)
pushes. Thus the end point need not pull information after its initial \pull" as the initiator
will \push" (revocation) data to registered listeners (end-points). Either periodic or aperiodic, this pull-once-push-many approach supports revocation where an end point receives
revocation noti cations from an initiator.
An end point will decide to specify its interest in periodic or aperiodic pushes from the
initiator based on how critical the revocation
a ects its service and its resources. For example, if the end point is a TelephoneDirectory service then providing information to a
requesting delegate (a secretary object) about
a revoked number is not very crucial, as the
delegate might not misuse the telephone number. In this case, periodic pushes from the
service department is not necessary and the
end point might settle in for aperiodic pushes
only. On the other hand, if the requested service is providing classi ed information, then
the end point needs to know the revocation of
the delegate (for example, a secretary object)
immediately. In this case, short-interval peri-

odic pushes from the service department may
be selected. The load on the server to keep
pushing revocation status of its delegates becomes worth its cost when compared to the
risk involved in providing classi ed information to any revoked delegate.

6 Status and Future Work
This paper has focussed on the way in
which delegation is structured and used in
SDM to support secure operation when multiple components together provide a given service. SDM builds upon exisitng mechanisms,
mainly those already established in the Java
JDK1.2 security framework, to establish a
practical basis for constructing exible yet secure components and support infrastruture.
SDM extends the JDK1.2 framework to include explicit support for principals. We have
provided implementation strategy for SDM to
be built over the JDK1.2 framework.
As outlined in section 2.2, implementation
of SDM requires that the JDK1.2 domain
model be extended to include principals, so
that each CodeSource will also have a principal associated with it. One domain will be
formed for each such <CodeExecutor, CodeSource>. Further authentication and access
control (and delegation) may then be based
on the CodeExecutor.
To support PrincipalDomains, the Java runtime system must maintain a mapping from
<CodeSource, CodeExecutor> pair to their
protection domains and also the mapping between protection domains and their privileges.
This could, for example, be implemented at
the execution stack level with the aid of class
blocks and the executing environment frame,
as illustrated in Figure2.
In future, we intend to implement our SDM
delegation framework over the JDK1.2 security framework. We have already implemented
access control mechanisms [16] based on CodeSource information. We plan to extend the
mechanism to include the information on principals to further control any access requests.

7 Discussion

tocols necessary to provide a very wide range
of security policies and trust levels. It presents
application writers and system administrators
with a exible, uniform API. SDM appears to
be the most conservative extension of the Java
1.2 security architecture that simultaneously
supports both delegation- and role-based security, along with revocation mechanisms that
are often needed in practice.
The design of SDM has also bene ted from
other work in security architectures, but differs from previous systems in signi cant ways:

DSSA. Roles are not explicit in DSSA[4]

and are achieved through their notion of
groups, whereas explicit support for roles is
provided in SDM. DSSA supports only combined delegation, whereas SDM supports both
combined delegation and composite delegation.

Varadharajan et al. The main revoca-

tion strategy proposed by Varadharajan et al
[14] propagates revocations through delegates.
These revocations might not take e ect due
to network problems or other distributed failures. Another solution proposed in [14] assumes prior-known end point. This is also supported in SDM. Approaches suggested in their
paper require changing the key associated with
a principal. This is not e ective in public key
systems, which are generally more manageable
and scalable in distributed system (and are
supported in SDM). They also suggest passing
a read capability of the delegation token and
not the token itself. Our approach is vaguely
similar in that the end point need to contact
the initiator before servicing. But by using the
pull-once-push-many approach, SDM does not
need to contact initiator because the initiator
will multicast revocation details, if needed.

SESAME. SDM provides both simple and

cascaded (composite, combined) delegation
with support for constraints whereas SESAME[8] supports only simple delegation. Also,
unlike SESAME, SDM also supports scalable
distributed naming schemes.

Kerberos. In Kerberos[13], the end-point

contacts authentication server for every signaSDM provides a realistic security framework ture authentication as it uses shared key apfor Java-based distributed object systems. It proach. SDM allows implementation via pubisolates the complexities of the underlying pro-
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